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ABSTRACT 
Quantitative Risk Assessment is one of the approaches to assess risks. A fuzzy set is a new 
mathematical tool to model inaccuracy and uncertainty. In this research paper, an integrate model has 
proposed to solve problem of uncertainty of initiative events and their consequences. Hazard and 
operability study, Bow-tie analysis, and layer of protection analysis are methods proposed together 
as the first step in the model for risk analysis. Reliability-fuzzy is the second step to deal with 
uncertainty, and simulation is the third step for more accurate of results. From the results realized we 
can judge that the integration between classical methods, fuzzy approach and simulation is greatest 
model for more reliability of quantitative risk assessment. 
Keywords: Reliability, Quantitative Risk Assessment, Hazard and Operability Study, Bow-tie 
Analysis, Layer Of Protection Analysis, Simulation and Modelling
INTRODUCTION 
 
The importance of risk assessment has increased significantly for industrial company 
especially in petrochemical industry, and this care have occurred after major accident 
witnessed in last decades in different area which cause death of thousands of workers, loss of 
property and negative impact on environment. The increasing complexity of engineering 
system has imposed substantial uncertainties and imprecise associated with data in risk 
assessment problems. Reliability of system is the ability to operate under designated operating 
conditions for a designated period of time or number of cycles through a probability. The 
Improve of reliability for prolonging the life of the item based on two steps essential, on the 
one hand, study reliability issues and on the other hand, estimate and reduce the failure rate 
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) for objective to estimate the outcome event probability of 
an event tree uses crisp probabilities of events to estimate the outcome event probability or 
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 frequency (Ferdous, 2006; Nieto-Morote & F. Ruz-Vila, 2011). In comparison, qualitative 
risk analysis identifies the possible outcome of initiating an event. The classifications of 
uncertainty, aleatory and epistemic uncertainties are the major classes (Adam, Markowski, M. 
Sam Mannan, 2010; Thalles Vitelli Garcez, Adiel Teixeira de Almeida, 2014). QRA in 
industry has been used to analyse hazards; however, despite the widespread use, qualitative 
methods suffer from a number of limitations. The resultant uncertainty combined with the 
natural or statistical variability within the often scarce information complicates scenario 
predictions and comparisons (Ferdous, 2006; Adam, Markowski., 2007; Refaul Ferdous, 
Faisal Khan, Rehan Sadiq, Paul Amyotte, and Brian Veitch, 2011; Adam, Markowski, Sam 
Mannan, Agata Kotynia, Henryk Pawlak, 2011). 
In this study, a new model for quantitative risk assessment is proposed based on three steps: 
the first is a hybrid of three methods from three approaches – qualitative, quantitative and 
semi quantitative – HAZOP, Bow-tie and LOPA; the second uses fuzzy sets with methods 
mentioned before to deal with the problem of uncertainty of inputs and outputs; and the third 
is integer simulations using Simulink for the most accurate of results, which facilitates the 
complexity of calculation.  
CLASSICAL METHODS 
 
Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) 
Hazard and operability study HAZOP has been widely used in chemical process industries, 
especially in some complex process plants such as processes, human operations, mass 
material, many pieces of equipment, a number of instruments, several control systems, safety 
and environment, etc., interweaved to form a complex process plant. The experts have 
underscored  the following four aspects as benefits of HAZOP: (1) determining whether a 
given operation or activity has the potential to give rise to a hazardous situation, (2) 
determining the range of hazardous events that the operation or activity could present, (3) 
identifying the routes by which each of these hazardous events could be realised, i.e., 
identifying the potential incident scenarios, (4) providing some prevention suggestions or 
measures to avoid hazardous events if the safeguards are not enough. However, there are 
problems facing the application HAZOP: (1) the inheritance instrument of the experiential 
knowledge (Wang, Chin., K.S., Poon, G.K.K. & Yang, J.B., 2009); (2) the classification of 
accident causes.  
  
Bow-Tie Analysis 
Bow-tie analysis is an integrated probabilistic technique that analyzes accident scenarios in 
terms of assessing the probability and pathways of occurrences. It is intended to prevent, 
control and mitigate undesired events through development of a logical relationship between 
the causes and consequences of an undesired event  psychologists, has become useful and 
effective for assessing risk where a qualitative approach is not possible or desirable. It 
provides a representation of the causes of a hazardous scenario event and likely outcomes 
(Huang, Chen, T. & Wang, M.J.J., 2001b; Xiaomin You, M. ASCE and Fulvio Tonon, M. 
ASCE, P.E., 2012; Refaul Ferdous, Faisal Khan, Rehan Sadiq, Paul Amyotte, Brian Veitch, 
2012). Bow tie analysis is a quantitative risk method, used by Shell Oil company for risk 
management at the beginning of the 1990s. Bow-tie combines three methods, which are FTA, 
ETA and LOPA, to follow the process of risks from the causes of initiating events using FTA 
to consequences using ETA and LOPA for preventing accidents and mitigating the 
consequences. Bow-tie is performed as a qualitative method to assess the incidents and 
accidents, as well as a quantitative method, which has been found to be more effective in 
calculating probabilities of final events consequences (Ericson, 2005; CCPS, 2000; Adam, 
Markowski, Agata Kotynia, 2011; Eduardo Calixto, 2013). 
Layer of protection analysis lopa 
LOPA was suggested as one method to determine the integrity level for safety instrumented 
functions (SIFs): classifying SIF to determine the appropriate safety integrity level (SIL), 
developing a tool to reduce the number of scenarios of quantitative risk assessment (QRA), 
identifying “safety critical” equipment and systems, developing a semi-quantitative tool to 
make consistent risk based judgments within an organisation and facilitating communication, 
such as SIS, SIF, SIL and IPL, between the hazard and risk analysis community and the 
process control community (Ossama, Abul-Haggag1, Walied Barakat, 2013; Nouara 
Ouazraoui, Rachid Nait-Said, Mouloud Bourareche, 2013; Lei Ma, Yongshu Li, Lei Liang, 
Manchun Li, Liang Cheng, 2013). 
For LOPA, the analyst must limit each analysis to a single consequence, paired to a single 
cause (initiating event). In many applications of LOPA, the goal of the analyst is to identify 
all cause-consequence pairs that can exceed the organisation’s tolerance for risk (CCPS, 
2001).
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Integration Layer of protection analysis in the Event tree analysis 
 
 
QUANTITATIVE CALCULATION OF RISK AND FREQUENCY 
 
The following is the general procedure for calculating the frequency for a release scenario 
with a specific consequence endpoint.  
 
Where:                                   (2) 
And risk reduction factor for reducing the risk to a tolerable level  
                                                              (3) 
For objective to reach tolerability of risk, the value of    consider as a minimum risk 
reduction factor (MRRF). 
 
RELIABILITY AND FUZZY 
PROBIST Reliability  
 
PROBIST reliability is the same as conventional reliability theory. It considers probability 
assumption and the binary-state assumption. PRO stands for probability and BIST stands for 
binary states. The reliability of component or the system that is computed using the PROBIST 
reliability theory is PROBIST component or PROBIST system. In PROBIST system, the 
component or system failure is based on the probability theory. Also, two deterministic or 
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 crisp states, which means fully operating and fully failed states, are considered and the system 
will be in one of these two states at any given point in time (Cai, C. Y Wen, & M. L. Zhang, 
1991; Cai, C. Y. Wen, and Zhang, M.L., 1993; Cai, 1996). 
The PROBIST reliability is often viewed as a fuzzy set. PROBIST reliability can be in the 
form of linguistic values or most of the time the form of an interval. This reliability can be 
viewed as a fuzzy number. Most of the ongoing research considers reliable as a fuzzy number 
in the form of triangular, trapezoidal and normal fuzzy numbers, which are presented in the 
following section (Huang, 1995). 
 
PROBIST reliability as a TFN  
 
PROBIST reliability is assumed as a triangular fuzzy number (TFN). The essential part of 
fuzzy set theory is getting the information or data from the experts, and hence the expert’s 
judgment plays a vital role in the evaluation of reliability. Let the interval value of initial 
reliability Ri be [l,r]. The middle or crisp value m of this T.F.N is   i.e. the  T.F.N is 
symmetric [10]. Let n be the number of experts. The PROBIST reliability values of the 
system are obtained from these n experts based on their judgment.Their expertise is 
represented by T.F.N:  
E(i) = (m(i) - d(i), m(i), m(i) + d(i)) ;    i=1,2,3,….n                                                (4) 
We need to arrive at a single T.F.N value of the PROBIST reliability from the expert’s 
judgment. Let the final T.F.N of the PROBIST reliability be F=(f-g, f, f+g). Parameters f and 
g are determined using 
                                   (5) 
    ; 1≤ i ≤ n       (6) 
A similar procedure may also be applied for trapezoidal fuzzy numbers, i.e. PROBIST 
reliability, as the trapezoidal fuzzy number. 
 
Fuzzy PROBIST series system reliability 
 
The PROBIST series system is shown as below: 
 
  
Figure 2: Component of system en serie 
1 2 3 n 
 N=  number of components  
Ri= reliability of component I in T.F.N.   ; i= 1,2,…..n 
The series system reliability is given by: 
                                    (7) 
Let Ri = [ li, mi, ri]  be a T.F.N    ; i = 1,2………n 
Here, we use the α-cut method to get the fuzzy PROBIST series reliability. 
 
Without using α-cut method, RSS can be computed. 
If Ri = {mi – d1i, mi, mi + d2i                             (9) 
Where d1i  and  d2i are the spreads from mi of T.F.N on left and right side respectively for each 
component i. If  d1i  and  d2i, are equal, then T.F.N is a symmetric T.F.N. 
RSS is given by: 
………….(10) 
Fuzzy PROBIST parallel system reliability 
The PROBIST parallel system consists of n components as shown below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Component of system en parallel 
A parallel system reliability in this case is  
               (11) 
Again, we consider RI as T.F.N. with [li, mi, ri] ; i=1,2,….n 
Using α-cut method: 
 
 
Without using α-cut method, RPS can be computed using the same notations as described in 
the earlier section as: 
1 
2 
3 
n 
  
Taking a trapezoidal fuzzy number, similar treatment can be given to obtain expressions for 
fuzzy RPS. 
Fuzzy Set Theory FS 
The fuzzy logic provides an inference structure that enables appropriate human reasoning 
capabilities. Fuzzy inference system FIS is a non-linear modeling approach that plots the 
relationship between input and an output using rule of set of fuzzy IF-THEN rules. Zadeh 
proposed the set membership idea to make suitable decisions when uncertainty occurs. Soft 
computing is a useful tool for solving problems in many fields (Canos, V. Liern, 2008; 
Bouchon-Meunier B, Yager R, Zadeh, 1995; Radim Bris, Sava Medonos, ChrisWilkins, 
Adam Zdráhala, 2013). Fuzzy set theory deals with mathematical model information 
uncertainties and has been developed and applied in a number of real world applications 
(Chen, TT. Pham, 2001; Refaul Ferdous, Faisal Khan, Rehan Sadiq, Paul Amyotte, Brian 
Veitch, 2012; Zadeh, 1965; Nait-Said, F. Zidani, and N. Ouzraoui, 2008; Nait-Said, F. Zidani, 
N. Ouzraoui, 2009; Wu Wei, Guangxu Cheng, Haijun Hu, Qi Zhou, 2013). 
 
Fuzzy Numbers 
A fuzzy number  is a subset of real line R, whose membership function (x) can be a 
continuous mapping from R into a closed interval [0,1] (Dubois, D. & Prade, H., 1978; Wang, 
J. B. Yang, J.B., Xu, D.L. & Chin, K.S, 2006).  The membership function of the number  
can be expressed as follows. 
(x)   =          (14) 
 
Where :[a,b]→[0,1] and :[a,b]→[0,1]. The former is called the left membership 
function and the latter is the right membership function (Abbasbandy, T. Hajjari, 2009; Wang, 
J. B. Yang, J.B., Xu, D.L. & Chin, K.S, 2006). If both given in Eq.(8) and  given in 
E q.(9) are linear as shown in Figure 1, then the fuzzy number  is a trapezoidal fuzzy number 
0,             otherwise   
 
0,             otherwise   
 
0,             otherwise   
 
0,             otherwise   
 and usually denoted by  In a special case b=c; the trapezoidal fuzzy number 
into a trianglar fuzzy number.  
=                                                (15) 
                                            (16) 
Fuzzy inference system FIS 
Fuzzy systems based on transformation of rules of reasoning human beings to mathematic 
equivalent for simplifying a system designer’s work, risk decision makers. The IF-THEN rule 
statements are used to illustrate the conditional statements that comprise fuzzy logic. Two 
types of fuzzy inference system can be demonstrated: linguistic (Mamdani Type) and Takagi–
Sugeno (TS) fuzzy models. Fuzzy sets provide a means to model the uncertainty associated 
with vagueness, imprecision and lack of information regarding a problem, a plant, etc. 
(Dubois, H. Prade, 1980; Zadeh, L.A, 1978).   
 
APPLICATION ON STORAGE TANK 
The storage tank is designed to hold a flammable liquid under slight nitrogen positive 
pressure under controls pressure (PICA-I) (CCPS, 2000). In addition, the tank is fitted with a 
relief valve to cope with emergencies. Liquid is fed to the tank from tank trucks. A pump (P-I) 
supplies the flammable liquid to the process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Equipment and valves 
FV  =  Flow control Valve 
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Figure 4:  Flammables liquid storage tank 
 
 Table 1: Application of HAZOP on system above for one case 
Guide 
word 
Deviation Conseq-
uences 
Causes Existing 
protection 
Action items or 
recommendations 
More of 
 
 
Increase 
LPG in tank 
LPG tank 
release 
 
 
-Failure of or ignoring LIA-I 
-insufficient volume in tank 
to unload truck 
-pressure rise exceeds 
capacity of PV-I   
Controls 
pressure 
(PICA-I) 
Reinforce safety by 
adding safeguards 
such as safety 
instrumented system 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Bow-tie with LOPA after the results using PROBIST to calculate probability of top event and 
consequences LPG tank release  
Figure 5 represents the integration of bow-tie analysis and layer of protection analysis for objective to get an 
acceptable case as low as reasonably practicable ALARP. 
Integration of simulation using SIMULINK and the fuzzy using Mamdani approach by MATLAB for reliability 
quantitative risk assessment after application of Bow-tie analysis and Layer of protection analysis. This is 
summarised in Figure 6. 
Figure 6:  Integration of simulation using (Simulink) and fuzzy approach in risk analysis methods Bow-tie and LOPA 
 Table 2: Results of PROBIST in Event Tree Analysis (Scenario 1) 
  
 
 
 
 
  
DISCUSSION 
The application of new model for risk assessment  has realized objectives as follow: As the first step, hazard and 
operability study, Bow-tie analysis, and layer of protection analysis, are three methods combined for risk 
assessment. The results af application mention that it is helpful model for risk analysis. The second step, 
PROBIST and Mamdani fuzzy is fittest to deal with uncertainty of outcomes. PROBIST assists with defining the 
range of Mamdani fuzzy is motivated to deal with all possibilities of outcomes and precise value in the range 
which is defined by PROBIST using centroid of area. The third step, integration of simulations with risk analysis 
methods, reliability and fuzzy approach. the results are motivate and are helpful: to precise results, facilitate the 
complexity of calculations and check the results of classical methods.  
CONCLUSION 
A new model has proposed to solve  problem of risk assessment from three perspectives. For analysis by 
integrate three methods HAZOP, Bow-tie and LOPA. Integration reliability and fuzzy approach to deal with 
uncertainty using PROBIST and Mamdani fuzzy. Integration of simulation for more accurate results, facilitates 
the complexity of calculation and checks the results of classical methods. From all this result, we can judge that 
integration between classical methods, fuzzy approach and simulation are the best model for reliability 
quantitative risk assessment. 
 
 
 
Alpha-cut PROBIST L BTLOPA PROBIST R BTLOPA PROBIST L Bowtie PROBIST R Bowtie 
0 1.1721E-12 4.2778E-09 4.6886E-10 1.9012E-07 
0.2 8.6370E-12 2.8024E-09 2.3991E-09 1.4298E-07 
0.4 2.5499E-11 1.7386E-09 5.2040E-09 1.0288E-07 
0.6 5.7573E-11 9.9837E-10 8.9959E-09 6.9331E-08 
0.8 1.1248E-10 5.0636E-10 1.3887E-08 4.1848E-08 
1 1.9990E-10 1.994E-10 1.9990E-08 1.994E-08 
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